In this paper, we investigate the cost efficiency of German local governments in the state of Baden-Württemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach. Besides being the first study on German data, we add two elements to the literature. First, we provide a comparative perspective, allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature. Second, unlike most previous studies, we explicitly account for exogenous or non-discretionary influences when estimating municipal efficiency scores. The results suggest that disregarding such exogenous factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels. Particularly, underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity, while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment.
Value for Money? German Local Government Efficiency in a Comparative Perspective

Introduction
While voters appreciate the provision of public goods, they often are much more reluctant to finance these goods when their tax bill arrives. The literature on vote and popularity functions, for example, clearly illustrates that taxation has a significant political cost for incumbents in the sense that it reduces their popularity or re-election odds (e.g., Niskanen, 1975; Peltzman, 1992; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006; Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b; Geys, 2010) . This desire for public goods but reluctance to pay for them suggests that an efficient provision of public goods and services -understood in terms of a maximum amount of public good provision at given (fiscal) costs (or 'value for money') -is likely to win voters' hearts.
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As a result, government efficiency may be an important strategic tool for governments wishing to attract mobile factors of production. 2 Moreover, arguments in favour of fiscal decentralisation often implicitly depend on the efficiency of local governments' public good provision. Indeed, the economic benefits from a further decentralisation of tasks are likely to be negligible when tasks are shifted to inefficient local governments (see also Geys and Moesen, 2009a) .
Despite this wide-ranging interest in efficient governments, studies measuring the efficiency of the public sector have thus far mainly focused on efficiency in particular areas of public good provision such as waste collection, police services, road maintenance, public libraries and so on (for reviews, see Kerstens, 2000, and Worthington and Dollery, 2000) . Still, exceptions exist in which researchers regard the overall performance of locallevel (surveyed below) or higher-level governments (e.g., Afonso et al., 2005 Afonso et al., , 2010 . Such 'composite' approaches do not restrict their attention to one specific public good, but rather allow for a more general view on government performance. Although they are more difficult to implement than single policy analyses, they have the explicit benefit of allowing an assessment of how effectively a government is performing its multitude of tasks (rather than one specific task).
1 Obviously, voters might also care about government effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, adequateness, appropriateness, and so on (Dunn, 2004, 223-231) . In this paper, however, we concentrate on one single aspect of government provision: namely, its efficiency. 2 The existence of geographic patterns in government efficiency in Belgium and Norway suggests that such competition is indeed at play (see Geys, 2006; Revelli and Tovmo, 2007) . Moreover, the strategic importance of government efficiency is often implicitly acknowledged in theoretical models of tax and yardstick competition. The reason is that such models generally normalise the provision of public goods to one (cf. Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2002; Geys and Vermeir, 2008c) , which implies that "lower cost of provision can be interpreted as higher government efficiency" (Geys and Vermeir, 2008c, 472) .
The present study adds to the literature assessing overall government performance in three ways.
 First, we focus on local governments in Germany (using a cross-section of 1015 German municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg for the year 2004). This setting has two main advantages: (1) the institutional setting is the same for all municipalities such that our analysis is unaffected by the institutional design of local governments, and (2) labour and capital costs are largely identical across the municipalities of one state such that factor price divergence -apart from property prices (for which we include a control variable) -is not an issue (which is important since the efficiency analysis is based on a cost function approach).
Specifically, interest rate homogeneity is given by the fact that a) all municipalities have access to the same capital market and b) the federal government guarantees the absence of differences in risk premiums for all German jurisdictions. Wage homogeneity is guaranteed via uniform collective labour agreements.
3  Second, unlike previous studies, we provide an explicitly comparative perspective in the sense that we embed our results in the broader literature. While the efficiency levels estimated depend on the sample employed (and thus are not comparable across countries), important insights can nonetheless be gained from comparing the distribution of efficiency across various countries.
 Finally, we estimate municipal efficiency while explicitly accounting for exogenous or nondiscretionary influences in the municipalities using the 'one-step procedure' proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) . This not only provides a more appropriate measure of local government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political influences on local government efficiency (in Germany).
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The results of our analysis show that, on average, German municipalities produce their output with costs approximately 21% to 24% above the efficient frontier. Controlling for background variables, this reduces to approximately 13% to 16%. This reduction in the average level of 3 A new collective wage agreement for public service at the municipal level (Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst der Kommunen) became effective in 2005. This agreement allows for performance-oriented wages and thus undermines wage homogeneity, which is the reason our most recent data concern the year 2004. 4 With the exception of Tanaka (2006) , Geys and Moesen (2009b) , Geys et al. (2010) , Kalb (2010) previous studies of global local government efficiency use a two-step approach to explore how socio-economic and political influences affect efficiency (e.g., De Borger et al., 1994; Borge et al., 2008) . They first estimate efficiency, and then asses how this result is affected by various socio-economic and political variables. This, however, has two downsides. First, it does not correct the efficiency estimates for the influence of these external forces. Second, recovering significant effects for the background variables in the second stage violates the assumption that the error term in the first stage is independent and identically distributed -leading to biased estimation results (see Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991) .
observed inefficiency by about one third indicates the importance of correcting the estimated efficiency levels for exogenous or non-discretionary influences. Although comparing these findings with results from other countries is complicated by various heterogeneity issues (e.g. different time periods, analytical tools, methodologies and input/output measures employed throughout the literature; see also below), the average German municipality appears to lag somewhat further behind the best-performing German municipalities than the average Australian, American, Belgian, Greek or Japanese municipality lags behind the 'best practice' in their respective countries. The reverse holds in comparison to Norway, Spain and Portugal.
Note, importantly, that since efficiency is estimated based on the decision-making units within a given dataset and does not constitute an absolute indicator, one cannot interpret our findings as stating that German municipalities are less efficient than, say, Australian ones, but more efficient than, say, Japanese ones. It may indeed well be that the most efficient Australian (Japanese) municipalities are much less (more) efficient than the most efficient German ones, but this is impossible to evaluate using the employed methodologies (this will become clearer when we discuss the methodology in more detail in section 3.2). Hence, one can only make comparative statements regarding the distance between the most efficient municipalities in a given country (which are determined within the country-specific sample) and non-efficient municipalities. Finally, with respect to the effect of the exogenous municipality characteristics, we find that costs increase (and efficiency this is underestimated) with population density and touristic attraction, while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an extensive overview of the existing empirical literature on 'composite' local governments' technical or cost efficiency. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis including the methodological approach used and an introduction to the institutional setting of the local governments in German state of Baden-Württemberg. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 4.
Literature review
As mentioned in the introduction, studies on the (in)efficiency of the public sector tend to concentrate on one particular area of public goods provision: say, waste collection, administration, road maintenance, public libraries, and so on (see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000; Worthington and Dollery, 2000; Hammond, 2002; Kalb, 2009) . While interesting in their own right, such sector-specific studies do not allow determining overall local government efficiency. In effect, concentrating on "one particular element of service provision may be inadequate (or even misleading)" (Ashworth et al., 2006, 12) when the intention is to evaluate public sector performance more generally. The reason, obviously, is that local governments may specialize in certain areas of service provision (e.g., due to a particular socio-economic composition of the population), and score much better in this particular field than on various other segments of their public good provision. To evaluate overall local government efficiency, various aspects of local government service provision should be included in the analysis. Interestingly, such 'composite' approaches to local government efficiency have attracted only limited attention in the past and existing analyses are restricted to a rather small sample of countries. given that DEA is quite sensitive to the number of inputs and outputs employed). In contrast, the only Japanese study, Tanaka (2006) , employs only SFA and reports an average efficiency score of around 0.89. Importantly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to directly control for the exogenous environment when estimating local government efficiency (Geys and Moesen, 2009b recently followed this example).
We will return to this below.
Four studies regard municipal efficiency in Spain: Gimenez and Prior (2007) To sum up, the existing literature on the 'composite' technical or cost efficiency of local governments suggests that substantial inefficiencies exist in the provision of public goods and services by local governments. While this is a consistent finding, the difference in average municipal efficiency -i.e. the efficiency level of the average municipality as compared to the country-and sample-specific 'best practice' -varies significantly across countries. One shortcoming of most of this literature, however, is the failure to account for exogenous or non-discretionary variables which may affect the performance of the municipalities (for exceptions, see Takala, 2006; Geys and Moesen, 2009b .
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Stevens (2005) , the performance of local governments also "partly [depends] on the particular environment where the authority operates. … It is therefore useful to consider the inefficiency of an authority net of these [background] factors" (Stevens, 2005, 93) . This implies that most previous studies are likely to have provided biased -and most likely inflated -estimates of local government efficiency. In the remainder of this study, we address the importance of incorporating the socio-economic (and political) environment in studies of local government efficiency in order to draw more accurate inferences. We do so using a sample of 1015 German municipalities.
Empirical analysis
German local institutional setting
The German state Baden-Württemberg lies in the southwest of Germany and, after two municipal mergers in 2006 and 2007, consists of 1109 municipalities ranging in size from approximately 100 inhabitants in the smallest municipality (Böllen) to almost 600,000 inhabitants in the largest one (Stuttgart). In each case, the local government is composed of two political institutions: (1) the local council which is elected every five years and constitutes the main decision-making body of the municipality, and (2) the mayor who is directly elected for an eight-year term. Both institutions have their own statutory responsibilities, which are the same across all municipalities.
Though the municipalities constitute the lowest level of government in Germany, they have considerable autonomy in raising revenue and assume significant responsibilities at the expenditure side. 
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg and own calculations
The revenue obtained by local governments serves to finance three types of tasks: (1)
Voluntary tasks (e.g., libraries, theatres, museum, public swimming pools and so on), (2) duties without instructions by higher-level governments as to how local governments should perform the tasks (e.g., construction of municipal roads, fire departments, waste disposal and so on), and (3) duties with instructions of higher-level governments (e.g., running of local police authorities). 6 6 In the latter case, the state imposes detailed regulations on how municipalities should carry out these tasks. For a more detailed classification and description of these tasks see Gern (2005) .
The right-hand side of Table 2 provides a detailed overview of the expenditure shares of selected tasks (for the year 2004). This shows that expenditures on general financial management (e.g., interest and amortization repayments) account for roughly one third of total expenditures (34.55%). Social security (11.49%), public facilities and business development (11.36%), and architecture, housing and traffic (9.89%) each require roughly 10% of the overall budget. The remaining budget posts are of minor importance.
German local government efficiency
Estimation approach
Determining the efficiency of a given number of decision-making units (here: local governments) first requires the selection of a set of input-output combinations that designate efficient behaviour (i.e. those combinations where the inputs are most productively used).
Then, in a second step, one can designate deviations from this 'best practice frontier' as inefficiency. Both steps can be addressed in a number of different ways (for an introduction, see Lovell, 1993) . Specifically, the best practice frontier can be generated either parametrically or non-parametrically. In non-parametric approaches such as DEA (Farrell, 1957) or FDH (De Prins et al., 1984) , the frontier is created as a piecewise linear envelopment of the data. Parametric approaches, on the other hand, determine the best practice frontier on the basis of a specific functional form using econometric techniques. In evaluating deviations from this best practice frontier, one might interpret any deviation as inefficiency (a deterministic approach). This, however, is problematic since observed levels of inputs and outputs in real-world applications may be subject to measurement errors or stochastic influences. Moreover, decision-making units may differ in natural (e.g. geographical), socioeconomic (e.g. extent of unemployment etc.) or institutional restrictions, which will further distort the picture. To the extent that such disturbances exist, one should attempt to differentiate between these 'errors' and inefficiency by using a stochastic approach.
We build on the stochastic, parametric approach of efficiency measurement developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) . Employing a translogarithmic specification, a parametric frontier model can be written as (dropping subscripts for decision- 
where C designates the input indicator (which may represent the money equivalent of multiple inputs), y indicates the output indicators, s points to the number of outputs incorporated in the model and β r and λ rq are parameters to be estimated. The translogarithmic function extends the more basic Cobb-Douglas type cost or production function, and thereby allows for a much more general functional form (i.e. relaxing the strict functional form assumed under Cobb-Douglas). Specifically, in a Cobb-Douglas function, the third term on the right hand side of equation (1) is absent: i.e. only the (logged) levels of the outputs are included and not the squared values, nor the crossproduct terms. Obviously, the use of Cobb-Douglas versus translogarithmic functional form can be tested by assessing whether the coefficients λ rq are jointly significantly different from 0 (see below).
The crucial difference with the non-parametric deterministic approaches mentioned above is that this parametric method allows one to distinguish between the effects of measurement error and inefficiency. This is achieved by introducing a composed error term consisting of a symmetric component (v) (generally assumed to be white noise) and a one-sided non-negative component ( 0 ≥ u ) representing inefficiency. The latter component is mostly assumed to follow a half-normal or a truncated normal distribution (cf. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a; Méon and Weill, 2005) . Both error components are assumed to be independent. While estimation of equation (1) provides values for the composed error term (v + u), Jondrow et al. (1982) show that, for any organisation i, the conditional distribution of u i given (v i + u i ) contains all available information about u i . As a consequence, point estimates for the inefficiency component of any given decision-making unit i can be generated. One can thereby either build on the mean or the mode of this conditional distribution (see Jondrow et al., 1982) , though both generally lead to comparable results in empirical applications (hence, we only report the results based on the mean of the conditional distribution in section 3.2.2). These point estimates indicate to what extent inputs can be reduced without reducing current output levels. (1) need to account for potential heterogeneity of factor costs across the jurisdictions under scrutiny. Fortunately, factor price divergence is not problematic in our setting since the costs of labour and capital are identical for all municipalities of BadenWürttemberg (i.e. they face the same interest rates and wages). Interest rate homogeneity is given by the fact that a) all municipalities have access to the same capital market and b) the federal government guarantees the absence of differences in risk premiums for all German jurisdictions. As a result, no risk premium differences occur across German jurisdictions.
Wage homogeneity is guaranteed via uniform collective labour agreements, which, until 2005, did not allow allows for performance-oriented wages. Consequently, the same work was always remunerated with the same wage (eliminating any potential wage heterogeneity).
Moreover, we include a control variable which proxies property price divergence (see below).
Secondly, the efficiency estimates as derived from equation (1) treat all municipalities on the same footing. However, exogenous or non-discretionary influences may shape local government performance (e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1995) , even though the municipal government cannot affect these elements in the short (or even long) run. Examples of such external forces are the geographic characteristics of the area or the socio-economic make-up of the population. Disregarding the effect of such background factors might well lead to an overestimation of government inefficiency. While previous works (at best) assess how such factors affect local government efficiency in a two-stage procedure (see note 3), we address this issue by assuming that the inefficiency term (u) in the error of equation (1) is a function of a set of background variables (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1995) . In other words, and as discussed in Coelli (1996) , u is "assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at 
where the error term of equation (3), w, is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance 2 σ (Battese and Coelli, 1995) . The latter assumption assures that the inefficiency component u can only take values bigger than or equal to zero. 
Definition of variables and description of data
This extension of the empirical model corrects the derived efficiency measures for the existence of non-discretionary factors and, at the same time, allows us to assess how these exogenous variables affect local government efficiency. As discussed in section 2, this correction is generally disregarded in previous studies investigating the 'composite' performance of local governments.
We employ the above approach to examine the (in)efficiency of 1015 municipalities in the German state Baden-Württemberg in the year 2004 (data availability precluding inclusion of the remaining municipalities). To determine the input, output and background variables in the model, we rely on the previous literature (see table 1, section 2). Following this 'common standard' has the advantage that our results are to some extent comparable with these studies.
Specifically, we employ total (net) current primary expenditures in the municipality in 2004 as our prime input variable (C). These include all spending on the current budget minus the difference between interest and amortization repayments and income from financial investments. We do not include spending from the capital budget as the fluctuating payment profile of large scale infrastructure projects is likely to heavily distort our cross-section based analysis. To measure the level of local public good provision, we include six output variables relating to important social, educational, recreational and infrastructure responsibilities of the German local governments: (a) number of students in local public schools (primary and secondary education), (b) number of kindergarten places, 10 (c) surface of public recreational facilities, (d) total population, (e) share of population older than 65, and (f) number of employees paying social security contributions. 11 Clearly, these are rather crude proxies for the full range of services a municipality provides (as indicated in Table 2 ). Unfortunately, however, this is a common stumbling block of 'composite' local government efficiency studies (e.g., Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996) .
Finally, and crucially, we include two sets of (exogenous or background) variables that describe the municipalities' production environment and political constraints. The former is accounted for via population density, unemployment rate and the number of touristaccommodation facilities. Population density relates to the rural/urban divide and thus proxies the ability of the authority to concentrate local public service provision (Stevens, 2005) and the heterogeneity of property prices (which may affect the cost situation of municipalities).
While high population density might entail cost advantages due to regional concentration of services, higher property costs in urban areas (and other problems of agglomeration) may render production more costly. The overall effect on municipal expenditures (and inefficiency) is therefore ambiguous. A similar ambiguity emerges for the unemployment rate since it implies a) higher spending on unemployment and housing benefits (a 'cost effect') and b) lower demand for high-cost (or high-quality) public services (demand for which is 10
Only the total number of public and private kindergarten places of the year 2002 was available. While it would clearly be preferred to use only the number of public kindergarten places, such data were not available. Moreover, public kindergarten places make up a large fraction of total kindergarten places (44% in 2002).
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One might wonder whether and how population size, share of elderly and social security contributors depend on active local public policies or tap into municipal management. Still, population in our view proxies the extent of administrative tasks (such as issuing various types of documents) whereas the number of elderly indicates service provision to the elderly (e.g., retirement homes). The number of employees paying social security contributions proxies for infrastructure and business development services because such services are associated with employment. While we agree that more direct measures of local public policies in these areas (e.g., number of beds in nursing homes) would be valuable, these are unfortunately not available.
likely to increase with income levels; a 'preference effect'). 12 Finally, the number of touristaccommodation facilities is included since municipalities located in touristic regions (like the Black Forest or the region around Lake Constance) have a higher demand for high-quality public services (see Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic, 2005 ). An increase (decrease) in the number of tourist-accommodation facilities therefore is expected to increase (decrease) costs -and lead to an underestimation (overestimation) of efficiency if left unaccounted for.
As political background variables, we include a measure of political fragmentation and the share of seats of the left-wing parties in the local council. Political fragmentation is measured via the Herfindahl index using the seat shares of the main national parties (CDU, FDP, SPD, GRÜNE) and of the so-called 'free voter unions'. 13 Specifically, it equals the inverse of the sum of the squared seat shares of these parties. 
Empirical results
High concentration (or low fragmentation)
represents low political competition and is therefore expected to reduce efficiency (cf. Ashworth et al., 2006) . The share of seats of left-wing parties measures the impact of ideology on technical efficiency. Although left-wing governments are generally assumed to favour higher spending, it is a priori not clear whether this also leads to lower efficiency.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table A1 in Appendix. Note that these exogenous variables clearly do not fully describe the production environment of German municipalities, but data constraints obviously restrict our opportunities here.
We present two sets of results. The first disregards the possible effect of the exogenous variables in the measurement of the local government (in)efficiency and could be seen as a 'baseline' model. It also represents the common approach in the foregoing literature (see section 2). The second set of results includes all exogenous variables. In each case, we estimate both a Cobb-Douglas and translogarithmic cost functional form and assess which provides the best fit. The results -more particularly, the estimates regarding municipal (in)efficiency -for each of these estimations are brought together in Note that we decided to include the variables "unemployment rate" and "population density" as exogenous and not as output variables to the estimation equation, since these variables can hardly be considered as the result of active policies of the local governments. They rather describe the environment in which the local governments have to make their decisions.
Note that, by definition, municipalities on 13 Technically, the Herfindahl index equals the sum of the squared seat shares of each party.
14 'Free voter unions' are loose federations of persons not belonging to specific political parties and exist only at the local level.
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Note that the output variable "students in public schools" has an unexpected negative sign in Table A2 . This could be due to the fact that municipalities receive targeted annual grants per student under the municipal the best practice frontier obtain efficiency scores of one, while all other municipalities receive scores larger than one (to indicate their excessive cost structure). Portugal. While it is impossible to compare the efficiency levels across various datasets (given that the efficiency estimates are constructed from the particular dataset employed and are relative rather than absolute measures), this suggests that the German municipalities tend to portray a relatively large dispersion of (in)efficiency. Of course, one should be careful in making such inference since significant heterogeneity in terms of time periods (although a majority of studies in Table 1 regards one or more years in the 1999-2005 period, as does our own analysis), methodologies and input/output variables exists across these studies. A true comparative project would require a simultaneous analysis of various countries using the same analytical tools, time frame and variable definitions. Although a much more ambitious project, it would clearly constitute a very relevant research objective in future analyses.
fiscal equalisation scheme in order to equalise the differences in spending among the municipalities (see also Ministry of Finance of Baden-Württemberg, 2006, p. 39) . Since schools are located (mainly) in larger municipalities, the subsidy received for an additional pupil might actually exceed the marginal cost for this pupil (e.g., due to decreasing fixed costs); this would lead to an (overall) negative effect of the variable "students in public schools". Note also that the baseline effects of the variables "kindergarten places" and "surface of public recreational facilities" remain statistically insignificant. Yet, the majority of the interaction terms including either of these variables are highly significant, underlining the importance of the inclusion of these variables in the estimation model (as well as the use of the translogarithmic approach to pick up non-linearities and interaction effects).
Importantly, once we include the exogenous control variables (see columns 2 and 4), estimated inefficiency substantially declines. In this case, the average municipality now only needs to reduce costs with 11% to 13% to settle itself on the 'best practice' frontier (slightly above the Japanese and Belgian estimates; see section 2). This constitutes a reduction by about one third. Although we should be cautious to equate these inefficiencies with potential cost cuts (see note 9), it is clear that ignoring the potential impact of exogenous constraints can have a significant effect on the inferences from the model. Moreover, the bias from disregarding exogenous constraints not only affects the estimated level of inefficiency, it also has a strong impact on the heterogeneity of German local governments' 'value for money'.
This variation is represented in figure 1 , where we show the number of municipalities (on the y-axis) with a given level of inefficiency (on the x-axis) using the results from the translogarithmic specifications. Light-grey cubes reflect the distribution when disregarding control variables, black cubes give the distribution when controlling for background variables.
Clearly, the mass of the distribution shifts powerfully towards the left (i.e. towards higher efficiency) when controlling for exogenous influences, and centers more strongly around these low-inefficiency values. Also, while the tail of the distribution does not get shorter, it gets noticeably thinner (thus supporting the decrease in the standard deviation reported in Before we conclude this section, we briefly describe the findings for the non-discretionary variables included in the model (see table A2 of Appendix A for details). As mentioned, including these exogenous variables not only provides a 'corrected' measure of local government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political influences on local government efficiency in Germany. Specifically, our results show that the unemployment rate has a statistically significant negative sign, suggesting that the preference effect (i.e. reduced demand for high quality public goods) outweighs the cost effect (i.e.
higher spending on unemployment-related benefits). 16 The effect of population density, on the other hand, is not clear, since in the translogarithmic specification the cost disadvantages resulting from, say, higher property prices appear to outweigh agglomeration advantages, whereas in the Cobb-Douglas specification it is the other way round. The statistically significant positive effect of tourist-accommodation facilities indicates that more touristic regions have a higher demand for high-quality services (in line with theoretical expectations).
Finally, concerning the political constraints, it is found that high levels of political concentration or monopolization (i.e. low values for the Herfindahl index) are associated with low efficiency; this effect is highly statistically significant in both specifications. On the other hand, an increasing share of seats of left-wing parties in the local council seems to decrease efficiency; the coefficient is, however, only significant in the Cobb-Douglas specification.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the cost efficiency of German local governments in the state of Baden-Württemberg in 2004, and put the results in a comparative perspective. Moreover, we explicitly account for exogenous, non-discretionary factors when estimating (in)efficiency.
This, in contrast to most previous work, not only provides a more appropriate measure of local government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political influences on local government efficiency (in Germany). Our results indicate that the average municipality in Baden-Württemberg produces its output at costs that are 17% to 20% higher than the 'best practice' -or 11% to 13% once we control for the exogenous or nondiscretionary constraints on municipal production. This leads to two conclusions. First, in 16 Note that there are two administrative units at the local government level in Germany (i.e. counties and municipalities), both of which have their own responsibilities. Counties constitute the higher administrative level; they are associations of a fixed number of municipalities. Since it is mainly the responsibility of the counties -and not of the municipalities -to finance housing and/or welfare benefits to the unemployed, another possible reason for the negative sign of the variable "unemployment rate" could be that the counties are the main bearers of the costs for the unemployed (and not the municipalities).
relation to previous work, the distance between the 'average' and 'best practice' municipalities in Germany is somewhat larger than in Australia, Belgium, Greece, Japan and the US. It is smaller, however, than in Norway, Spain or Portugal. Although suggestive, one should keep in mind here that heterogeneity across studies in terms of time periods, methodologies and input/output variables makes a strong interpretation of these differences inadvisable. A true comparative project -i.e. a simultaneous analysis of various countries using the same analytical tools, time frame and variable definitions -remains a relevant, though ambitious, research objective for future work. Second, the strong reduction in measured (in)efficiency once controlling for exogenous constraints convincingly illustrates that the modeling of such production constraints should be an indispensable element in 'composite' efficiency analyses. Disregarding these background variables leads to an excessively unfavorable view of public sector efficiency.
Although, compared to most former studies, our approach provides a more realistic quantification of (in)efficiency, we have indicated throughout the manuscript that one should nevertheless be careful to equate the estimated inefficiencies with potential cost cuts for four reasons. First, the output indicators employed in this study are rather crude proxies for the full range of services a municipality provides. While a common stumbling block of 'composite' local government efficiency studies, future research should try to augment the output side by incorporating information on quality indicators (resulting, for example, from surveys concerning citizens' satisfaction with municipal services). Second, we do not establish a 'true' best-practice frontier, but rather generate it from the data. This implies there is no a priori definition of 'best practice', but rather one that is inferred form the observations employed.
Unless a commonly accepted theoretical definition and operationalisation of 'efficient behaviour' can be agreed upon, it is hard to see how this natural limitation of any real world dataset could be overcome in future. Third, we clearly do not fully describe the production environment of German municipalities, but data constraints are an obvious restriction on how far one can go in this respect. Finally, a replication (and extension) of the analysis relying on sufficiently lengthy time-series cross-section data would allow incorporation of time trends and additional controls for fixed municipality-specific effects. .54 ** Note: N = 1015. All variables are in natural logs excepting the variables of the inefficiency model; ** (*) denotes significance at 5% (10%) level. Cobb-Douglas vs. translogarithmic tests the restriction that the coefficients for all quadratic and cross products terms are jointly insignificant (and has a Chi 2 -distribution). The results are obtained using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) .
Appendix A
